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TAKINGS: AN APPRECIATIVE RETROSPECTIVE
Eric R. Claeys*
I. WHY TAKINGS
In these short remarks, I hope to assess Richard Epstein's scholarly legacy by
evaluating the legacy of his book Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent
Domain.' I do so for a few reasons. One relates to my own interests. While I am
honored to contribute to this tribute to Professor Epstein, I am exceedingly conscious
of how little I know of the many areas on which he has written. In most of those areas,
I can highlight my own ignorance more easily than I can identify any shortcomings in
Professor Epstein's work. Since I have written considerably about takings, I prefer
to focus there and discreetly distract attention away from my ignorance elsewhere.
My other reason for focusing on Takings relates to Professor Epstein. If he is going
to be judged by any single work, Takings is probably that book. Takings is now twenty
years old. Professor Epstein once told me that nine books out of ten are not cited
within a decade of their publication. Since Takings is still getting cited (or, if you like,
vilified) two decades after its publication, it seems fair to survey the influence it has
had (or, if you like, the damage it has wrought).
II. TAKINGS'S CONTROVERSIAL LEGACY
If you think Ijest when I use terms like "vilified" and "damage wrought," consider
the reaction that Takings provoked immediately after its publication. In prominent
reviews, by respectable and otherwise quite thoughtful scholars, Takings was called
"a disturbing book,' '2 a "patent and howling failure,"'3 and an "intellectual wasteland."4
Peg Radin described its style of argument as "philosophical camel-swallowing. 5 Frank
Michelman dismissed the kind of property theorizing associated with Epstein's project
as "obtuseness." 6
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I RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, TAKINGS].
2 Calvin R. Massey, An Assault upon "Takings" Doctrine: Finding New Answers in Old
Theory, 63 IND. L.J. 113, 113 (1987) (book review).
3 Thomas Ross, Taking Takings Seriously, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1591, 1592 (1986).
' Mark Kelman, Taking Takings Seriously: An Essay for Centrists, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1829,
1830-31 (1986) (book review).
' Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1669 n.6 (1988).
6 Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 1600, 1628 (1988).
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And those criticisms are the quick dismissals, not the jeremiads. "The book's
only useful contribution," Mark Kelman decried, "may be to expose more fully the
moral venality and intellectual vacuity of formal, legalized libertarianism."7 Kelman's
hostility paled in comparison to that of leading property theorists, who intuited that
Takings unsettled how legal scholars have talked about property for generations.
Joseph Sax sputtered that Epstein is a "prisoner of an intellectual style so confining
and of a philosophy so rigid that he has disabled himself from seeing problems as
beyond the grasp of mere formalism." 8 And, for my personal favorite, Thomas Grey
fulminated that "Takings belongs with the output of the constitutional lunatic fringe,
the effusions of gold bugs, tax protestors, and gun-toting survivalists."9
III. TAKINGS AND TAKINGS DOCTRINE BETWEEN 1985 AND 2002
If two or three critics dismiss a book as a polemical screed, the book probably is
a screed. But if many leading academics make such accusations, and continue to do so
long after the book has been released, the book probably has struck a raw and important
nerve. Takings struck such a nerve.
I doubt I can give a comprehensive explanation of all the reasons why Takings was
so controversial. In this Essay, let me focus on two reasons that seem to me in hind-
sight particularly important. One reason is doctrinal. While Takings was primarily a
theoretical work,' ° Epstein illustrated his theory by applying its lessons to consti-
tutional takings doctrine. In doing so, Epstein made a surprisingly persuasive case
that federal takings doctrine could support most of the principles that informed pre-
New Deal "Lochnerism."" Lochnerism refers to Lochner v. New York12 and the col-
lection of substantive due process doctrines by which pre-1937 federal courts declared
invalid laws that unreasonably interfered with natural-law-based individual property
and liberty rights.' 3 Of course, when I call Epstein's case "persuasive," I do not mean
that he convinced all readers. But many lawyers and the U.S. Supreme Court have
invested a great deal of intellectual capital in the principle that Lochnerism was dis-
credited in 1937, then and forevermore. While Takings by no means persuaded such
lawyers, to them it seemed convincing enough to persuade more impressionable
minds. In particular, Takings was alarming because it seemed to offer a roadmap
that might be followed by the conservative and originalist judges that President
7 Mark Kelman, Searching for the Libertarian Core of Legalism: Comments on Richard
Epstein's Takings 34 (unpublished manuscript), quoted in Ellen Frankel Paul, A Reflection on
Epstein and His Critics, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 235, 237 (1986) (emphasis omitted).
8 Joseph Sax, Takings, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 279, 293 (1986) (book review).
9 Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MiAMI L. REV. 21, 23 (1986).
'o See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 1, at 3 ('This book is an extended essay about the
proper relationship between the individual and the state.").
" See id. at 277-82.
12 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
13 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 1, at 279-80 nn.29-30.
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Ronald Reagan and Attorney General Edwin Meese were appointing to the federal
bench.
Takings was plausible in large part because it finessed some of the main prob-
lems that conventional legal wisdom assumed were lethal to Lochnerism. In the con-
ventional wisdom, one leading problem with Lochnerism was not substantive but
interpretive. In the late New Deal, Justice Robert Jackson, 4 William Winslow
Crosskey,5 and others insisted that Lochner was wrong primarily because "due
process" did not give judges a blank check to strike down laws they happened to
dislike. The original meaning of "due process," after all, was process due or "the
principle of legality."' 6 While this concept is somewhat rough around the edges, the
core refers to something like the following: the right to be punished by force of law
only by duly appointed and impartial government officers, only under pre-existing
legal procedures, and only for substantive conduct that was illegal under positive
law in force at the time of the offense. That conception of due process caused the
late New Deal Court to scale back the Lochner Court and early New Deal Court's
economic substantive due process case law.
Takings still provided a simple but deft response to such criticisms: even if
Lochner substantive due process did not have a sound pedigree in the text of the
Constitution, the Takings Clause 7 does. While the late New Deal Court narrowed
substantive due process, it did not eliminate it outright. To narrow it, it confined the
doctrine to apply primarily when state regulations threatened individual constitutional
rights specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights." The Court has since recast some
older Lochner substantive due process cases as pure Takings Clause cases. 19 But as
Takings intimated, the Takings Clause could plausibly cover most Lochner doctrine.20
After all, it specifically protects "private property," and not against deprivations without
due process but against "takings."'" Many elements in American law assume that
"private property" refers not only to the "vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical
14 See, e.g., ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY
OF CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER PoLrIfcs 56 (1941).
'" See 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1106-07 (1953).
16 See Gary Lawson, Due Process Clause, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION
337, 337-38 (Edwin Meese I et al. eds., 2005).
17 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"8 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
'9 The Court frequently cites Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226 (1897), as authority for incorporation of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001). Strictly speaking, Chicago, Burlington was not an
incorporation case but a case in which natural-law or higher-law principles informed due
process. Be that as it may, the Court has recast Chicago, Burlington as an incorporation case.
20 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 1, at 279-81.
21 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Of course, "takings" are qualified by the public-use and just-
compensation requirements. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617.
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thing," but also "the right to possess, use[,] and dispose of it."22 As Epstein showed,
this understanding's pedigree goes back to Blackstone.23 In this same tradition, the
notion of a "taking" can apply not merely to actions that oust a landowner from her
land, but also to any tort-like interference with possession, use, and control for any
species of property.24 Within federal takings doctrine as it is conventionally under-
stood, Takings thus circumvented important textualist and originalist objections to
Lochner substantive due process doctrine. 25 In the 1980s, President Reagan and
Attorney General Meese made it a priority to defend originalism, and they nomi-
nated originalists like Antonin Scalia and Robert Bork to the federal bench. Conven-
tional academics thus worried that Takings would give a new group of judges, not
sufficiently educated in the conventional catechism, a guidebook to revive Lochner-
style property and contract rights.
These worries turned out to be largely overdrawn. For one thing, the case law has
moved on. Because Epstein's main intentions were theoretical and not practical, the
roadmap he drew in Takings was too radical to penetrate doctrine directly. I will sum-
marize the main constraints quickly here, for I have explained them in greater detail
elsewhere.26 The originalist arguments against Lochnerism were never the only reasons
why the doctrine fell out of favor; those arguments always ran with substantive argu-
ments in favor of interventionist property regulation. As it turned out, many of Reagan's
and Meese's conservative judicial appointees turned out to favor those pro-regu-
lation substantive arguments-if not as enthusiastically as Justices William Brennan
or John Paul Stevens, at least closely enough not to support any aggressive rollback
of Great Society or New Deal regulatory programs. Many judicial conservatives are
moderate or, if you like, conventionalist. They adhere to precedent to a far greater
extent than originalists or strong advocates of judicial restraint, in part because they
believe in stare decisis for its own sake, and in part because they subscribe to most of
the substantive principles in the seminal New Deal cases. 27 Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy turned out to be such moderates or conventionalist conservatives.28
More surprisingly, Takings's substantive arguments did not reconcile them-
selves easily with important substantive attachments of the Court's unqualified
22 United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945).
23 See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 1, at 22 ("[P]roperty... consists in the free use,
enjoyment, and disposal of all [an Englishman's] acquisitions, without any control or diminution,
save only by the laws of the land." (quoting WIuJAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2, *2)).
24 See id. at 35-56 (discussing torts against property as "takings").
23 See id. at 277-82.
26 See Eric R. Claeys, Takings and Private Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99 Nw. U. L.
REV. 187 (2004). For a survey of the same cases that is far more enthusiastic about the result,
consider Laura S. Underkuffler, Tahoe's Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of Property
and Justice, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 727 (2004).
27 See Claeys, supra note 26, at 190, 203-15.
28 See id. at 189-90.
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conservatives--Chief Justice Rehnquist and Associate Justices Scalia and Thomas.29
Blackstone' s conceptions of "private property" and "takings" require interpreters to
construe constitutional text broadly enough to allow courts to develop sophisticated
doctrines to distinguish proper "regulations" of property from confiscatory "takings"
of use and disposition rights. Such tests sweep broadly. The interplay between the
prima facie taking and the defense of police regulation expands the discretion of the
judges who consider both sides. That sweep and discretion go against the conser-
vatives' preferences for bright-line and formal rules.3"
These two factors caused the takings counterrevolution to peak and ebb in the
same case, the Court's 1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.31
In Lucas, the Rehnquist Court's moderates agreed with the conservatives that, in
regulatory-takings law, the Court's general interest-balancing formula ought to give
way to a per se rule compensating owners when regulations eliminate all productive
uses of their land not already limited by background property law.32 However, Justice
Kennedy concurred separately to warn that he did not want to see the Court's takings
law ossify around "a static body of state property law. 33 In 2001, in a separate opinion
in the relatively narrow decision Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, Justice O'Connor hinted
that she would not follow Lucas broadly.' She insisted that, in regulatory-takings
cases, she would continue to follow as her "polestar... the principles set forth in Penn
Central," the dominant restatement of regulatory-takings law.35 In 2002, Justice
Stevens wrote for a six-vote majority including Justices Kennedy and O'Connor to
limit Lucas virtually to its facts and insist that Penn Central's government-friendly
interest-balancing formula remained the framework within which most regulatory-
takings claims ought to be tried.36
Takings's doctrinal lessons have not been durable in the academe, either. Most
legal academics are unlikely to be convinced by Epstein's doctrinal arguments, for they
are not sympathetic to the Lockean and classical-liberal underpinnings of those argu-
ments. More surprisingly, however, many of the legal academics who are sympathetic
to Lockean classical liberalism have not been impressed by Takings's doctrinal argu-
ments. Academics sympathetic to classical liberal political theory tend to be sympa-
thetic to originalist constitutional theory.37 While such academics may be impressed
29 See id. at 190.
30 See id. at 220-21.
3' 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
32 See id. at 1014-15.
33 See id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
4 See 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
31 Id. (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
36 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
321-22 (2002).
31 I make this claim descriptively and as a claim about correlation without any further
claim on causation. Gary Lawson, for one, maintains there is no necessary connection between
libertarian or conservative politics and originalist interpretive commitments. See Gary Lawson,
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by Takings on the merits, they do not take its doctrinal implications seriously. Most
originalist academics doubt that the Takings Clause is doctrinally relevant to state
property disputes. The Takings Clause limits the actions of states only if the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause incorporates that Clause; originalist scholars
doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause incorporates other con-
stitutional guarantees. 38 Because state and local regulations-zoning, conservation,
preservation, and rent control-raise most of the difficult takings questions, this
view of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause would dramatically shrink
the federal courts' takings docket.
Takings's doctrinal lessons may become relevant again to academic scholarship,
but it is difficult to say. Even if the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause does
not limit states from taking use and disposition rights by regulation, the Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause still may. 39 But the meaning of that
clause is one of the most difficult problems in constitutional law. Supreme Court
doctrine treats this clause as virtually a dead letter, for the Slaughterhouse Cases read
the clause to impose only a few core national privileges already guaranteed elsewhere
in the Constitution.' Some scholars, notably David Currie4 and John Harrison,42
hold that the clause does not protect substantive rights but formal non-discrimination
rights. In other words, states have substantial discretion regarding what "privileges"
and "immunities" to provide for their citizens, but once they have chosen whatever
privileges and immunities they decide to provide, they must provide those rights on
justifiably equal terms to all citizens.43 Others, notably Michael Kent Curtis' and Akhil
Amar," hold that the Privileges or Immunities Clause serves as an incorporation clause.
In their view, the clause makes applicable to the states the legal rights, including habeas
Conservative or Constitutionalist?, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 81, 82 (2002).
38 See Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill ofRights?:
The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). For alternative views, consider MARK
A. GRABER, DRED ScOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONsTITuTIONAL EVIL 62-66 (2006); James
W. Ely, Jr., "To Pursue Any Lawful Trade or Avocation": The Evolution of Unenumerated
Rights in the Nineteenth Century, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=881833.
39 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States .... ").
o See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 76 (1873).
41 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUN-
DRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 239 & n.12 (1985).
42 See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1419-20 (1992).
41 See id. at 1422-24.
44 See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 65 (1986).
41 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 387-89 (2005)
[hereinafter AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTrruION]; AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 166-69 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS].
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corpus and Bill of Rights guarantees, that the Constitution makes applicable to the
federal government.46 Still others are sympathetic to the position taken by Supreme
Court Justice Bushrod Washington in the 1823 circuit decision Corfield v. Coryell.47
In this view, the Privileges or Immunities Clause does protect substantive rights,
natural rights deemed in Civil War political thought to be essential "privileges" or
"immunities" of citizenship in a free and republican state.4" Professor Epstein has
encouraged such a reading of the clause, aithough he readily admits that this reading
requires much more detail work.4
Although I cannot prove my intuition with academic rigor here, I suspect that the
Corfield interpretation is correct, that Epstein is on the right track, but that there is even
more detail work to do than Epstein has suggested. Even scholars who are originalists
are not sufficiently sensitive to the ways in which pre-1900 jurists used terms like
"privilege," "immunity," "right," and "freedom."50 In some contexts, these terms were
used as synonyms. In others, the terms differed in subtle ways.
My intuitions follow those of David Upham5 and Adam Mossoff,52 who have
suggested that, in nineteenth-century legal context, "privilege" and "immunity" referred
to civil rights designed to secure the natural rights inextricably intertwined with citizen-
ship in a free and republican government. One pre-Corfield case construing the Comity
Clause53 determined whether a right counted as a "privilege" or "immunity" by asking
whether the right was a "civil right, which a man as a member of civil society must
enjoy."' In this context, "civil society" refers to a society of individuals living under
principles of social compact consistent with early Enlightenment natural-law and -rights
theory. To determine whether a particular legal right counted as one "which a man as
a member of civil society must enjoy," Upham has explained, this pre-Corfield case and
others drew generally on natural-law principles and Britain's colonial history to deter-
mine whether a given right was both natural and one that a republican government
46 See AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION, supra note 45, at 389; CURTIS, supra note 44,
at 202-03.
4' 6 F. Cas. 546,551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230) (listing "fundamental principles"
contained in privileges and immunities).
48 See Richard A. Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons: Reconstructing the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 334, 340-46
(2005); see also CURTIS, supra note 44, at 114-15.
41 See Epstein, supra note 48, at 344.
'o See, e.g., AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 45, at 169.
1 David R. Upham, Note, Corfield v. Coryell and the Privileges and Immunities of
American Citizenship, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1483 (2005).
52 Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson ThoughtAbout Patents? Reevaluating
the Patent "Privilege" in Historical Context, 92 CoRNELLL. REV. (forthcoming 2007), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=892062.
13 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
" Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 565 (Md. 1797).
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could withhold from aliens but not citizens." In this conception, privileges and immu-
nities consisted of rights like the right to travel; to acquire, use, and dispose of one's
real and personal property; to be free from alien-based commercial taxes; to practice
one's own trade; and to enjoy the general rights of life and liberty necessary to exercise
these more citizen-based rights.' Obviously, privileges and immunities excluded rights
that were wholly the creation of political life, like rights of public office." Less ob-
viously, they also excluded rights that were so essential to human freedom that natural
law required them to be provided to all persons by all governments--republican, des-
potic, and others in between. 8 For instance, though a republican nation could grant
or withhold legal property and contract rights from aliens as a matter of indulgence,
it could not withhold from aliens the right to religious conscience any more than it
could from citizens.59 This latter implication is surprising, even perverse. It suggests
that the Comity Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause deny the federal
government the power to protect American citizens from state invasions of what many
regard as their most important rights. Nevertheless, originalism claims to follow the
plain and original meaning of text, no matter what the consequences.
In any case, if this reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is correct, the
rights to acquire, use, and dispose of property count as Fourteenth Amendment "privi-
leges," and Takings is relevant for academics who are interested in the original meaning
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. If so, if Professor Epstein cares to issue a new
edition of Takings, and if he cares more about making his title more accurate than
snappy, he may want to retitle the second edition Abridgements. Takings is a dense
book because it considers seriously thejustifications that a classical-liberal government
has to regulate property without confiscating it.6° Under the Fifth Amendment, those
regulatory defenses justify property interferences that would otherwise count as con-
stitutional "takings." 6' Under the Fourteenth Amendment (originally construed), those
defenses justify interferences that would otherwise count as "abridgments" of one
species of constitutional privileges or immunities.62
All the same, in the case law, it remains the case that Tahoe-Sierra63 discredited
most novel regulatory-takings challenges for the foreseeable future. In the scholarship,
Takings has a tiny hole to thread between the substantive commitments of most
property scholars and the formalist commitments of most constitutional originalists.
5 See Upham, supra note 51, at 1494-96.
56 See id. at 1493, 1498.
17 See id. at 1493.
" See id. at 1497-98.
'9 See id. at 1495 (election), 1500 (property), 1523 & n. 183 (conscience, citing N.Y. CONST.
of 1777, art. XXXVIII).
60 See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 1.
61 See id. at 100-04.
62 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
63 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
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That hole will probably not broaden in the foreseeable future. Yet even if its impact
was limited, Takings still helped initiate a significant change in constitutional doctrine.
Many legal academic works aspire to do as much. Few succeed, and fewer still inform
the law as much as Takings did for fifteen years.
IV. TAKINGS'S THEORETICAL LEGACY
Takings's longer-lasting legacy, however, has been for property theory. Looking
back, Takings may have done more to lend respectability to a classical-liberal con-
ception of property than any other legal scholarship written in recent memory. Legal
scholarship tends to assume that the best metaphor for describing property is the
"bundle of rights," a package of unrelated rights each of which may be included or
removed as social policy requires. Takings sketched in one understandable work an
alternative conception: property as a unitary whole of complementary rights.' Takings
did not by itself discredit the still-dominant "bundle-of-rights" metaphor, and it left
unanswered many important questions about the classical-liberal conception. Never-
theless, Takings made the classical-liberal conception respectable enough to deserve
consideration in subsequent theoretical scholarship on property. Neither Tahoe-Sierra
nor subsequent scholarship can diminish this important contribution.
To get a sense of the contrast between Takings and conventional property theory,
consider the following quote from one property casebook:
In an earlier era, theorists tended to emphasize the unitary nature
of ownership .... The owner had the right to use or dispose of
the thing owned, with relatively little regard for the rights of others
.... Currently, most theorists think of ownership of property as
a "bundle of rights" or figuratively, a "bundle of sticks." One
might have a right to use a thing, but not to sell, bequeath or
otherwise transfer it. Alternatively, one might have a right to
use or transfer land, but not to build on or otherwise develop it.
Under this theory, the bundle of rights can be disaggregated into
distinct rights or sticks. According to this view, it is misleading to
talk of ownership of any object; one can only talk of owning a
number of distinct rights with respect to that object.6"
I choose this quote because it is representative of mainline property scholarship. The
authors provide no citations for these claims. They do not need to, for they are re-
stating a way of breaking down legal rights and responsibilities that is generally shared
by most academics. The authors softly suggest that the classical-liberal conception
64 See EPsTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 1.
65 EDWARD H. RABIN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN PROPERTY LAW 1 (5th ed.
2006).
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of property was extreme, because it allowed owners to use their own property "with
relatively little regard for the rights of others."66 Appealing to people's prejudices in
favor of progress and modem trends, they then tout as more sophisticated and refined
a view whereby property consists of "a number of distinct rights" rather than an
integrated whole.67 In what follows, let us refer, as many academics do, to this modem
view as the "bundle-of-rights" view.68
The "bundle-of-rights" view is far more contestable than most contemporary
academics assume. To be sure, it is merely an analytical tool. An analyst does not
generate any particular assignments of property rights or duties simply by reducing
the competing interests into particularized rights and duty claims. Even so, the "bundle-
of-rights" approach still facilitates relatively interventionist theories of government.
The central question dividing classical-liberal property theory from contemporary
property theory is this: as a general matter of government policy, is it better to maxi-
mize an owner's control over the important policy decisions associated with assets
we call property, or is it generally better to make these assignment decisions on an ad
hoc basis, leaving owners, regulators, consumers, neighbors, and other outside inter-
ested parties with different input in different situations? Classical-liberal theories
of government assume the former. The unitary approach to property promotes the
goals of classical-liberal theories of government: By maximizing owners' control over
important use and disposition decisions, integrated property rights exploit owners'
general information advantages over outsiders, simplify relations between owners
and strangers, and encourage owners to invest in their assets. Since the early twentieth
century, however, prevailing theories of government have preferred to intervene
more often. They prefer to set aside these general and slow-developing goods to
pursue more immediate goods preferred by legislative majorities. The "bundle-of-
rights" approach facilitates such regulation. Because it treats different property claims
as disaggregated rights, it expands the free action that legislators and regulators have
to set policy. Once property is disaggregated, regulators can sort through particular
rights claims piecemeal. Regulators may socialize a few owners' rights to satisfy
the demands of legislative majorities while still leaving the owners with a substantial
residue. Regulators can insert or remove different sticks in an owner's bag, but the
owner still has "property" as long as she still has a bag and other sticks.
To appreciate this connection between property theory and government theory, one
must go back to the period from 1880 to 1930. Early in this period, leading political
scientists at new research universities propounded more interventionist theories of
government.69 One academic, Lester Ward, proposed a new social science he called
66 See id.
67 See id.
68 See id.
69 See, e.g., DENNIS J. MAHONEY, PoLmcs AND PROGRESS: THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL SCIENCE (2004); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 3-114 (1973); DAVID M. RiccI, THE
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"sociocracy" and defined as "'the scientific control of social forces by the collective
mind of society for its advantage.""70 Woodrow Wilson defined the "object" of con-
stitutional government as, first, "to bring the active, planning will of each part of the
government into accord with the prevailing popular thought and need," and, second,
to give to the operation of the government thus shaped under
the influence of opinion and adjusted to the general interest both
stability and an incorruptible efficiency. Whatever institutions,
whatever practices serve these ends, are necessary to such a
system: those which do not, or which serve it imperfectly, should
be dispensed with or bettered.7'
Such theories of government provided important groundwork for legal realism.
Many if not most realists subscribed to the assumptions about expertise that followed
from theories of government and administration like Ward and Wilson's. For instance,
Edward Robinson contrasted the "experts" of the classical-liberal order, who were
"continually mistaking the vividness of their moral indignation for the probable effi-
ciency of their devices for social control," with the real experts--elite lawyers who
understood themselves to be "social engineers. '"72 Other realists drew the necessary
implications for property theory. As has been explained elsewhere,73 Wesley Hohfeld
developed a new taxonomy of legal obligations to make legal terminology more
precise.74 Importantly for property theory, he reconceived of in rem rights as clusters
of in personam rights. In classical-liberal property theory, an owner' s right over a thing
was understood as a right to exclude the rest of the world from that thing. In Hohfeld's
conception, the owner instead enjoyed thousands of fine-grained rights to be free from
interference by the many individuals who might have an interest in that thing. "[Tihe
supposed single right in rem.., really involves as many separate and distinct 'right-
duty' relations as there are persons subject to a duty."7'
TRAGEDY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: POLITICS, SCHOLARSHIP, AND DEMOCRACY (1984); John
Marini, Progressivism, Modem Political Science, and the Transformation of American
Constitutionalism, in THE PROGRESSIVE REVOLUTION IN POLITICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE:
TRANSFORMING THE AMERICAN REGIME 221 (John Marini & Ken Masugi eds., 2005).
70 1 LESTER F. WARD, DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY 61, 137 (1883), quoted in CHARLES
EDWARD MERRIAM, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES 330 (Johnson Reprint
Corp. 1968) (1920).
71 WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (1908).
72 Edward S. Robinson, Law-An Unscientific Science, 44 YALE L.J. 235, 236 (1934).
71 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970, at 333-50 (1997).
74 WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASON-
ING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 23, 35-37 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923).
" See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judi-
cial Reasoning, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING
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Although Hohfeld never used the phrase "bundle of rights" himself,7 6 Hohfeld's
contemporaries quickly used his taxonomy of legal obligations and his parsing of in
rem rights to recast property as such bundles of rights. Thus, in an article on rate regu-
lation, economist Robert Hale recast the general "right of ownership in a manufac-
turing plant [to be], to use Hohfeld's terms, a privilege to operate the plant, plus a
privilege not to operate it, plus a right to keep others from operating it, plus apower
to acquire all the rights of ownership in the products."77 In a short comment on tax
law, Arthur Corbin claimed that "'property' has ceased to describe any res, or object
of sense, at all, and has become merely a bundle of legal relations-rights, powers,
privileges, immunities.""
The realists' view of property dominated so thoroughly for so long that, by the
1970s, most legal academics ceased to take seriously the earlier alternative. In Private
Property and the Constitution, Bruce Ackerman began his argument by establishing
that "one of the main points of the first-year Property course is to disabuse entering
law students of their primitive lay notions regarding ownership. They learn that only
the ignorant think it meaningful to talk about owning things free and clear of further
obligation."79 Instead, "the law of property considers the way rights to use things
may be parceled out amongst a host of competing resource users."' Ackerman con-
nected this contrast about property to the corresponding contrast about expertise by
associating the primitive view with "lay" people and the non-primitive view with
"scientists.",8 1 "[S]o far as the Scientist is concerned," he concluded, "it would be much
better (but for the inconvenience involved in abandoning shorthand) to purge the legal
language of all attempts to identify any particular person as 'the' owner of a piece of
property. 82 Ackerman was not advancing new ground with this statement. Indeed,
around the same time, the U.S. Supreme Court insisted in Penn Central that:
"Taking"jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a
particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court
focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the
AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS, supra note 74, at 65, 74-82, 94. Instead of in rem and in perso-
nam, Hohfeld used "multital" and "paucital." Id. at 77.
76 See ALEXANDER, supra note 73, at 322 & 455 n.40.
77 Robert L. Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, 22 COLUM. L.
REV. 209, 214 (1922).
78 See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 YALE L.J.
429, 429 (1922).
79 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1977).
so Id.
8" Id. at 27.
82 Id.
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nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as
a whole ... 83
No surprise, then, that Thomas Grey concluded in 1980 that "[t]he substitution of a
bundle-of-rights for a thing-ownership conception of property has the ultimate conse-
quence that property ceases to be an important category in legal and political theory."'
These passages fairly reflect what academic and judicial opinion leaders thought
of property circa 1985. The "bundle-of-rights" metaphor had obliterated the classical-
liberal approach--Grey's "thing-ownership" view and Ackerman's "primitive" and
"lay" view. While other works may have tried to resurrect and refresh the classical-
liberal view, Takings succeeded in doing so. Takings made respectable the arguments
why property can and should consist of the fullest rights of control, use, and disposition
consistent with the like rights of others and the proper needs of the public.85 Classical-
liberal property theory is often derided on the ground that it leaves little room to make
property rights relative to the public's needs; using leading examples, Takings defined
and made specific the most important justifications classical-liberal theory gives
governments to restrain abuses of property rights.86 Contemporary law and theory
assume as true the "bundle-of-rights" view of property; Takings explained why prop-
erty theory needs a "unitary conception of ownership" to get the common law and
the property system up and running.87 Time and again, he suggested that to sever the
rights of possession, use, and disposition "creates a high degree of incoherence with
no return payoff.,
88
Takings therefore made respectable and accessible in late twentieth-century legal
jargon a system of understanding property that had been treated more or less as a straw
man for at least a generation. If it did not persuade all of its readers, the vituperation
it generated confirms that its arguments were taken very seriously. After Takings,
classical-liberal property theory can no longer easily be brushed aside casually in legal
scholarship. Of course, such theory is still brushed aside, quite often. Nevertheless,
for serious scholars, Epstein raised the bar. Before Takings, one could assume that
the classical-liberal approach was merely a "primitive" and "lay" approach, while the
"bundle-of-rights" approach was the only "scientific" approach in town. After Takings,
serious scholars need to consider the possibilities that the law can draw non-facile
assignments of property rights and harms, connected by non-arbitrary causal con-
nections, and that these assignments generally promote social welfare by taking advan-
tage of the selfish information and production advantages owners have over neighbors,
competitors, and consumers.
83 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
4 Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Properly, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69,81
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
85 See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 1, at 57-62.
86 See id. at 107-21.
87 Id. at 61.
88 Id. at 60.
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To be sure, Takings did not establish the classical-liberal approach to property
beyond all criticism. The book consists of a meaty middle of case illustrations and
legal conclusions 9 bookended by a spare and more explicitly normative opening"
and conclusion. 91 Takings really assumes rather than establishes a Lockean under-
standing of government; its contribution is therefore to unfold what "property,"
"regulation," "taking," "public use," and "just compensation" all must mean for the law
consistent with that Lockean understanding. As a result, in an important sense, the
book's lessons are rather contingent: if liberty of action and the social goods created
by industry play a substantial or dominant role in one's conception of the good political
order, and if this political theory is more attractive than the many contenders Epstein
did not consider, then one can develop a coherent account of "property," "regulation,"
and "takings" to do the legal detail work such theory requires.
In addition, there are tensions simmering beneath the surface between the classical-
liberal cases Epstein mines and Epstein's rationalizations of them. Most of the leading
classical-liberal cases were written by judges steeped in a tradition of natural law
and natural rights, with roots in Cicero, Roman law, Locke, the Scottish common-
sense movement, Protestant theology, Grotius and other early Enlightenment treatise
writers, and other sources.' While different sources in this tradition varied in emphasis
and outlook, many founding era and nineteenth-century Americans embraced a con-
sensus view-with all the dangers that come from consensuses, to be sure-insisting
that the freedoms of life, liberty, and property were natural rights, circumscribed by
principles of natural law limiting the proper boundaries in which such rights could be
exercised. In Takings, and even more so later, Epstein has mined this tradition for
its results while subtly replacing its foundational commitments. Epstein began as
a natural-rights theorist. By the time he wrote Takings, he was torn between natural-
rights theory and a rule utilitarianism that generally applied Bentham's and Hume's
basic commitments to modem academic vernacular.93 Since then, Epstein has become
a dyed-in-the-wool utilitarian94 -although, because of his rule utilitarianism, he is
'9 See id. at 35-329.
9 See id. at 1-34.
9' See id. at 331-50.
92 See, e.g., MARK WARREN BAILEY, GUARDIANS OF THE MORAL ORDER: THE LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1860-1910, at 24-112 (2004) (tracing antebellum
post-secondary education, moral philosophy as a theoretical and practical science, and the
concept of providential design); ANNA HADDOW, POLITICAL SCIENCE IN AMERICAN COL-
LEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, 1636-1900, at 43-167 (Williams Anderson ed., 1939) (tracing
political science-related courses from 1770-1865).
93 See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 1, at 5 (claiming that the natural-rights political
tradition "is consistent, I believe, with both libertarian and utilitarian justifications of indi-
vidual rights, which, properly understood, tend to converge in most important cases"). On
my read, Takings is slightly more utilitarian than natural-rights based. See, e.g., id. at 7-9
(developing the case for Lockean political theory in utilitarian terms).
94 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOcIETY: RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL
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more sympathetic to natural-rights theory and prescriptions than most contemporary
academics.95 As a result, the Epstein of Takings, and to a greater degree the Epstein
since, defends classical liberalism primarily because it promotes social welfare, not be-
cause it secures individuals liberty to which they are entitled by natural law and right.
Although I cannot develop my reservations fully here, let me at least suggest why
I prefer the American natural-law/natural-rights tradition and the earlier Epstein to the
more mature Epstein. On one hand, I doubt that Epstein's rendition of utilitarianism
is as stable as Epstein assumes. Interested readers may consult criticisms already made
of Epstein's utilitarianism by Larry Alexander and Maimon Schwarzschild96 and by
Eric Mack,97 so let me simply restate some of the more prominent objections. Many
of Epstein's justifications for basics like self-ownership and property acquisition are
problematic.98 Some of Epstein's arguments, especially the need to define liberty rights
with reference to a non-arbitrary rule, can easily be finessed in societies that have
already established rights and then carry forward pre-existing assignments of ownership
and liberty rights." The typical counter-example is the American South of 1850,"°
which assumed and enlarged on the slave-holding patterns of the South of 1830.
Separately, it is difficult to say that, strictly as a predictive matter, all members of an
unorganized society would prefer self-ownership to other schemes, if the less talented
can identify the more talented and try to socialize their talent.' ' One may finesse
such objections by positing that some kinds of utility, like the utility in self-ownership,
rate so high that they dominate over more case-specific sources of utility. If not made
delicately, however, such arguments can be non-falsifiable and raise hard questions
LIBERTY WrrH THE COMMON GOOD 9-39 (1998) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR
A FREE SOCIETY]; Larry Alexander & Maimon Schwarzschild, The Uncertain Relationship
Between Libertarianism and Utilitarianism, 19 QUiNNIPIAC L. REV. 657, 657 (2000).
95 See EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 94, at 14 (acknowledging
that natural-rights theorists and classical-liberal utilitarians, "for all their differences.., are
all-when compared with the Marxists, socialists, communitarians, republicans, and feminists
of our time-peas from the same pod"); Richard A. Epstein, The Not So Minimum Content of
Natural Law, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STuD. 219 (2005) (using H.L.A. Hart's natural law theory
to develop a comprehensive account of basic legal institutions).
9 Alexander & Schwarzschild, supra note 94. For Professor Epstein's response to those
criticisms, see Richard A. Epstein, The Uneasy Marriage of Utilitarian and Libertarian Thought,
19 QuINNpIAC L. REv. 783 (2000).
" Eric Mack, Comment: A Costly Road to Natural Law, 12 HARv. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 753
(1989). For Professor Epstein's response, see Richard A. Epstein, Postscript: Subjective
Utilitarianism, 12 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 769 (1989).
98 See Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y, 713, 728-29 (1989).
99 See Richard A. Epstein, Taking Stock of Takings: An Author's Retrospective, 15 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 407, 415-16 (2006).
" See Mack, supra note 97, at 761-62.
101 Id. at 762-63.
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about whether rule utilitarianism is a sustainable form of utilitarianism at all.10 2 If
it is hard for utilitarianism to justify self-ownership, it is all the harder for it to justify
property ownership.
On the other side of the divide, I doubt Epstein sufficiently appreciates the best
of the natural-law/natural-rights tradition. In his most in-depth statement on natural-
rights theory, Epstein criticizes such theory for pressing to the "logical extreme" of the
maxim "'ftatjustitia ruat coelum" ("letjustice be done though the heavens may fall").°3
He thus makes the distinctly modem and anachronistic assumption that moral theories
with pedigrees in early Enlightenment political theory are deontological and not con-
sequentialist-such theories focus on the intrinsic merits of particular actions with little
regard for the larger consequences of such action. " Epstein also suggests that promi-
nent natural-rights writers tried to have it both ways, by appealing both to the super-
natural or natural obligatory foundations of individual rights and to the happy social
consequences of such rights. 05
While it would take considerably more space than I have here to prove the
point, I suspect Epstein's generalizations about natural-rights theory are not applicable
to American natural-law/natural-rights theory and its antecedents in the best early
Enlightenment liberalism. My sense is that many of the early natural-law treatise
writers, Locke, and the Americans did not conceive of natural rights as deontological
maxims or trumps. Rather, such rights were understood in consequentialist terms-in
some cases (the treatise writers and many of the Americans, though not Locke) in teleo-
logical terms. Many scholars, and especially many law professors, assume that theories
of natural rights and law must make deontological claims because they speak of nature
and moral rights. In reality, as political theorist Thomas West likes to say, many
natural-rights theories are "eudaimonistic,"'6 referring to eudaimoneia, the term
Aristotle uses to refer to complete ethical happiness. Such theories of ethical and
political philosophy first use psychology to identify the different sources of human
happiness. They then use reason to analyze those different sources, to determine
which provide the most useful and intelligible benefits for individuals, and which
seem the most durable and profound. As West"° and, at length, Peter Myers0 8 con-
tend, Locke's political philosophy follows this approach. The Second Treatise does
'02 See Alexander & Schwarzschild, supra note 94, at 660.
103 EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 94, at 11-12.
I4 Id. at 10-12.
105 Id. at 14.
"o See Thomas G. West, Nature and Happiness in Locke, CLAREMONT REV. BOOKS, Spring
2004, at 54, 55 (reviewing MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, LAUNCHING LIBERALISM: ON LOCKEAN
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2002)). West describes Locke's political and ethical philosophy in
such terms.
"07 Id. at 56-57.
'08 PETER C. MYERS, OUR ONLY STAR AND COMPASS: LOCKE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
POLITICAL RATIONALITY 37-39 (1998).
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so in muted fashion,1°9 and the Essay Concerning Human Understanding makes
even clearer the psychological and experiential foundations of morality and jus-
tice."' Locke's approach contrasts from ethical or political philosophies like that
of Immanuel Kant, whose second formulation of the "categorical imperative" holds
that a maxim is right only if the actor who follows it "can at the same time will that
it should become a universal law.' '. The "imperative" deduces rights from reason
and universal will without analyzing the ways in which human happiness is at once
motivated and limited by human passions. Teleological philosophers distinguish Kant
on this ground;" 2 my sense is that the opinion leaders in the early Enlightenment
natural-rights tradition could, too.
All the same, Professor Epstein and I are lawyers first and philosophers, if at all,
only second. While philosophers have every right to expect rigor in philosophical
justification, we lawyers understand that theoretical arguments need to be tempered
by the demands of government work. I do have my reservations about Takings's philo-
sophical foundations, but as a lawyer I admire the rejoinder that book made to decades
of contrary property theory. And as a scholar, I am grateful for the trail Professor
Epstein paved for those of us who admire a theory of property fit for the society in
which responsible citizens dedicate themselves to securing their mutual freedom.
109 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690).
10 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Peter H. Nidditch
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1690).
.II IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 30 (James W.
Ellington trans., Hackett Publishing 3rd ed. 1993) (1785).
l"2 On this basis, virtue ethicist Elizabeth Anscombe criticized that "imperative" as "useless
without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view
to constructing a maxim about it" and complained that Kantian ethical philosophy is often
not "equipped with a sound philosophy of psychology." G.E.M. Anscombe, Modem Moral
Philosophy, 33 PHILOSOPHY 1, 2,4 (1958). Contemporary natural-law scholar Alasdair Mac-
Intyre has criticized Kantian moral theories on similar grounds. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
Hume on "Is" and "Ought," in AGAINST THE SELF-IMAGES OFTHE AGE: ESSAYS ON IDEOLOGY
AND PHILOSOPHY 109, 124 (Univ. Notre Dame Press ed. 1978) (criticizing moral philosophy
influenced by Kant for making "the autonomy of ethics ... logically independent of any
assertions about human nature," and praising Hume and Aristotle because they "seek[] to
preserve morality as something psychologically intelligible").
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